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1 Introduction 
China has become one of the largest exporting countries in the world. Together with its rapid 
development and the large surpluses accumulated from international trade and investment, 
this has aroused intensive debates concerning the foreign exchange rate price of its currency, 
the Renminbi (RMB). Because during certain periods of its history the RMB exchange rate 
has been restricted to a fixed currency price under a fixed exchange rate regime. Although 
recently more free-market policies have been applied in the foreign exchange market, even 
today it is still not a completely free market. Therefore, if the data from the official market, 
which is the so-called official rate, are used in models designed under free market 
assumptions, test results might be misleading. 
In this situation, an exchange rate data series which mimics free market features is required to 
patch the deficiencies of the official rate. Hence, the data from the parallel market of foreign 
exchange, which co-exits with the official market in China, has been considered. In fact there 
have been two parallel markets operating in China: the swap exchange market and the 
underground black exchange market. The first of these was also fixed in a range by the 
authorities and so does not fit the free market requirement. Therefore, the latter which is not 
manipulated by the authorities directly has been selected to test whether or not it can be taken 
in place of the official rate over certain periods of time. The results of these investigations 
can inform a wide range of research questions and policy issues.  
For the reasons given above, it is necessary to show a link between the fixed official 
exchange market and the black exchange market rates, but also to establish that the black 
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market satisfies the requirements of a free market. Then we may be able to take the black 
market series as a suitable indicator of the value of the currency. 
So first, the possible casual relationship between the official exchange rate and the black 
market rate must be investigated. If evidence of a causal link is found, the connection 
between the official price and a free underground market will be confirmed. Secondly, we 
investigate whether fluctuations in the black market rate are associated with the major social 
and economic events that have affected China. If the evidence suggests that the series does 
respond appropriately we may take this as an indication that the black market approximates to 
a free market.  The analysis can be developed further in a quantitative manner by examining 
the extent to which the black market premium can be explained by various factors including 
policy interventions (captured through the use of dummy variables). 
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review the history of the Chinese 
parallel market, focussing on reasons for parallel market fluctuations. Section 3 reviews the 
empirical literature, and introduces the model to be used in our study. A more detailed 
discussion of the methodology and information about the data is given in section 4, and this is 
followed by the results of the analysis. A brief discussion and conclusion completes the paper. 
 
2 A review of the development of Chinese parallel exchange markets 
New China (the Peoples’ Republic of China) led by the Communist Party was established in 
1949. During the 1950s, as China recovered from World War II, only small scale foreign 
exchange deals through foreign trade, or private money transfers took place. In that period 
Yinyuan (Silver coin) still played the role as the hard currency and most of the private foreign 
exchanges used the silver price rather than the new Chinese Renminbi (RMB) Yuan. Entered 
60s, it came the 10-year’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, during which any private 
foreign exchange action was defined as espionage under the misshaped social economy. This 
situation lasted until the reforms of the 1970s. Similar as in some other developing countries, 
the move to marketisation gradually formed the foreign exchange market. However, because 
the official market was still tightly controlled by the authorities, and better prices were 
offered by unofficial markets, most private foreign exchange transactions took place through 
these underground channels. These markets, such as the underground black market that co-
existed with the official market, were beyond authority surveillance and are often referred to 
as parallel exchange markets.  
There were in fact two parallel markets in operation. The black market, the illegal 
underground market which still exists today, and the swap exchange market which was 
established for exchange trading between some enterprises and the appointed banks by the 
authorities. A review of the history shows, from 1979 to 1994, the swap market appeared 
twice, first between 1979 and 1985 and then again from 1991 to 1994. The foundation of the 
swap exchange market was the foreign exchange retention policy, which allowed Chinese 
exporters to retain a certain quota of foreign exchange. The swap exchange rate was higher 
than the official one to encourage more exports (foreign currencies were more expensive in 
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terms of RMB). The swap rate was partly officially determined and partly free, but it only 
existed in selected areas. For these reasons the swap exchange rate will not be discussed 
further in this paper and we will focus on the underground black market rate. 
Lindauer (1989, pp.1987) defines the black market as “the structure generated in response to 
government interventions that create a situation of excess supply or demand in a particular 
product or factor market.” Therefore the basic reason for a black market is the imbalance of 
supply and demand. Because of the tight foreign exchange trading limitations in the early 
period, the official supply could not satisfy market demand.  These imbalances reflect the 
deviations between the official and black market rates. The marginal revenue from the 
underground transactions stimulated the growth of the black market. 
In China, the black market originally started in some coastal cities especially in the south. 
Under the “centralised control and unified operations” foreign exchange policy, nearly all the 
private exchange transactions and some involving enterprises (above an authority regulated 
quota) were not permitted. But there was an inflow of foreign currencies that people were 
willing to exchange for RMB and this formed the Chinese black market. 
On the supply side, Ding (1998) indicates that one of the major sources of foreign currency is 
the overseas Chinese. Through both remittance and visits, foreign currencies flow into China 
and take a major proportion of the supply on the black market. Another large part of the 
supply comes from the domestic enterprises that used smaller amounts of foreign currencies 
than the authority’s quota. The final supply source is currency brought in by foreigners 
entering the country. On the demand side, the first element comes from the smuggling from 
Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and some developed countries. Second, domestic residents may 
for some reasons need foreign currency, for example people going abroad for education or 
work, or people saving foreign currency in an attempt to maintain the value of their personal 
assets. Third, enterprises engaging in international trade need currency to facilitate the 
importation of goods and services from foreign countries. 
Based on these various sources of supply and demand, and if the black exchange market can 
be seen as a free market, the next questions to consider concern the determination of the 
prices of foreign exchange in this market. Are the fluctuations what one would expect under 
free market principles or not? When the official exchange rate remains fixed due to controls 
by the authorities, to what extent does the black exchange rate reflect underlying market 
movements? To answer these questions, the prices of the official exchange market and the 
black exchange market need to be analysed.  
The series used to measure the official exchange rate is the price of RMB in US dollars 
(because in both the official market and the black market it is the main transaction currency). 
The US dollar is the most common and popular currency in the underground market. Plus in 
the official market RMB price is pegged to the dollar. Over a very long period the dollar is 
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the key currency for international settlement. Also the U.S. is the most important trading 
partner for China1.  
Figure 1 shows that the official RMB/USD exchange rate did not change until January 1972. 
As mentioned before, during this period China experienced a nationwide political movement 
and nearly the whole social economy was paralysed. After 1996, both the official exchange 
rate and black rate lines are quite steady, much smoother than the period before. The reason is 
that China had gradually reduced the foreign exchange restrictions through a series of 
regulations and rules after 1996. The market has permitted conditional foreign exchange for 
international payments and transfers for current account transaction from 1996. On 1st 
January 1996, the implementation of “Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the 
Management of Foreign Exchanges” eliminated the restriction on non-trade exchanges on the 
current account. Later on 13th May, the state administration of foreign exchange used the 
“Residents within the Borders Foreign Exchange for Private Purpose Use Methods” to release 
the restriction on personal foreign exchange acts. Then on 20th June, the Chinese central bank: 
the People’s Bank of China, enacted the “Provisions for Management of Foreign Exchange 
Settlements, Sales, and Payments”, announcing the lifting of restrictions on small quantities 
of foreign exchange on the current account. Therefore, from the end of the year 1996, the 
RMB was fully convertible on the current account, and the demands on the black market 
were reduced. Consequently the black market shrank to a low level after 1996, reaching a 
trough in 2002.  
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Figure 1 The Official Market rate and the Black market rate USD/CNY (1957M1~ 2002M12) 
                                                 
1
 The United States is the third largest trading partner with China, plus the foreign trade via Hong Kong, which ranks the 
second, should have the highest proportion in Chinese foreign trade. 
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The research in this paper is an attempt to quantify the relationship between the official rate 
and the black rate. Therefore, it does not make sense to use the data before 1972 because no 
matter how the black exchange rate changed, the official rate was always fixed on 
2.4618Yuan per Dollar by the authority, and this lasted for more than 25 years. In the 
analysis a lagged variable will be used in the model, so the data range must start one year 
earlier, in January 1971. By 2002 most of the black market foreign exchange had disappeared. 
Therefore, the comparison covers the period from 1972 to 2002, and analyses the difference 
between the black market price and the official market price. This is the so-called “black 
market premium”. (Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2 the Black Market Premium in Different Periods 
 
Based on the comments of Yin and Stoever (1994), further more specific explanations are 
given about each noticeable fluctuation in the black market premium over this period, linked 
to specific events as listed below: 
A. From the fifth month of 1975, the negative influences on the economy by the political 
movement the “Cultural Revolution” had been reversed by Mr. Deng Xiaoping, who 
was the actually leader1 of the Communist Party at that time. The difference between 
the official price and black market price was reduced.  
B. After the end of the “Cultural Revolution”, from 1979, the essential focus of the party 
was in developing the economy. After the stimulation provided by the related policies, 
the black market had a certain extent of development. 
                                                 
1
 Deng was selected as one of the vice-presidents on 8th Jan, 1975 in the second session of the Tenth Central Committee of 
the Party. Because of the poor health of the president Mao Zedong and the Premier Zhou Enlai, Deng became the effective 
leader of the party.  After Mao and Zhou both died in 1976, Deng was selected as the president in 1978.   
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C. In January 1984, the Committee of Economic Trade for Foreign Countries 1 
provisioned the restricted importation of 28 categories of merchandise and freed other 
categories. In March that year, the government decided to open up 11 coastal cities, 
and a further 15 coastal cities were added in May. In addition the central government 
adopted a report about the reform of the foreign trade system in September 1984, 
removing the state power centralisation and nationalised foreign trade company 
monopolisation, and allowed province-level organisations to undertake foreign trade 
transactions. The freeing of restrictions on the imports and the opening of the ports 
helped to increased demand for foreign currency to facilitate foreign trade and pushed 
up the black market premium value during this period.   
D. As mentioned before, from 1985 the unification of the swap exchange rate and the 
official exchange rate also reduced the black market premium.  
E. The foreign currency supplied by the government could not satisfy market demand. 
The increases requirement by the development of large scale foreign trade pushed the 
growth of underground market and induced price differences. 
F. The first Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centre (FEAC) was established in November 
1985 at Shenzhen, a coastal city near Hong Kong. This kind of adjustment centre was 
used for the enterprises to undertake foreign exchange transactions and the adjustment 
centre managed the exchange price through the supply and demand pressures. 
Because in 1986 there was an expansion of such adjustment centres all over the 
country, which cut the demand source of the black market from the enterprises, hence 
at the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987 the black market premium fell. However, 
large demands from the foreign trade companies above the quota of the adjustment 
centre occurred because of the adoption of “the Enterprise Operation Responsibility 
System” from March 1987. This policy, that enterprises were able to keep half of the 
profit amount but were responsible for losses, stimulated foreign trade. The premium 
increased sharply again. 
G. The Tiananmen Square incident happened in 1989, and the government cracked down 
on the movement of students. This had a marked effect on the reputation of the 
government. There was a loss of confidence in the RMB and as a result a big fall in 
the price of the currency in the black market. The premium reached an historical peak. 
H. The central government began the Strike-hard Campaign at the beginning of 1992, 
focussing on rampant crime. As one form of criminal behaviour, black market activity 
was restrained during this period. 
I. The Chinese authorities reformed the exchange rate system on 1st January 1994. The 
RMB price was unofficially pegged against the US dollar. Then the official market 
was under a managed floating exchange rate system based on market demand and 
                                                 
1
 The former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
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supply. This form of regulation, close to that of a free market, gradually reduced the 
difference between the official rate and the black market rate. 
J. In preparation for joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Chinese 
government announced the acceptance of the 8th item of IMF coordination on 1st 
December 1996. This marked the start of free convertibility for current account items. 
From then on the black market premium kept on a stable value for the dealers’ profit 
in only small scale transactions. 
Because of its nature as an underground illegal market, the size of the black foreign exchange 
market has depended on the degree of control exerted by the authorities, such as in the “Great 
Cultural Revolution” period and the “Strike-hard” period, when the black market transactions 
were sharply reduced. On the other hand, when the central bank did not have sufficient 
supplies of foreign currency to meet the demand, the black market became more developed 
and highly organized. For example in the 1990s when foreign trade was growing rapidly the 
shortage of foreign currency led to a boom on the black market. Similarly, when the degree of 
foreign demand was low on the official market, this only had a marginal effect on the black 
market. After 1996 the opening of exchange movements on the current account cut the 
demands of the black market from both enterprises and private individuals. 
As we can see from these reflections on the link between the black market premium and the 
major economic and political events of the period, it can be accepted that the black market 
did indeed have the features of a free market. To test the hypothesis more formally, that the 
black market rate can be used as a free market rate to replace the official market price in 
economic models, further econometric analysis is required.  
3 Economic models and empirical research 
An early model of the black market model was built by Boulding (1947) and Michaely (1954) 
looked at the foreign currency demand for purchasing imports or supplying them from illegal 
sources. In this way, long-run equilibrium occurs in the black market when both legal and 
illegal imports and exports are balanced. An imbalance of supply and demand may lead to 
illegal foreign import activities such as smuggling. Also, as it noted by Sheikh (1976), and 
Pitt (1984), the role of the black market is to balance the demand for smuggled imports and 
exports. Because the black market appears in some circumstances to be a way of hedging the 
expansion of illegal markets by the government, it can be ineffective in the face of excess 
demand or supply in the legal restriction or the official ceilings. Therefore, the black market 
plays an essential role in the foreign exchange market, and as Agénor (1992) notes, it reacts 
to macroeconomic policies, or unstable political and social conditions. 
3.1 Causality tests   
In empirical research, the analysis of black market rates usually starts by testing for a causal 
link to the official exchange rate. The common methodologies adopted are Granger-causality 
test and co-integration tests. Akgiray et al. (1989) conduct tests for the US dollar and the 
West German mark, and the results shows that a causal relationship does exist between the 
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official rate and the black rate. Many studies of developing countries have also found that 
causality and a co-integrating relationship exists between the official and black rates. Agénor 
and Taylor (1993) test a group of 19 developing countries and find a causal relationship 
exists for 11 countries, finding that on one side, the official rate affects the black market rate 
and on the other side, the black market rate sometimes can react to changes of the official rate.  
Studies of the Chinese market find similar evidence. Lu and Zhang (2000) use the model of 
Agénor and Taylor and test the relationship between the Chinese swap exchange market rate 
and the official exchange rate (from October 1988 to December 1992). Using the Granger 
causality test, augmented by an the Error Correction term, they find that the Chinese swap 
market rate “Granger Causes” the official rate, but not vice versa.  
Two directions of Granger causality are possible in a bivariate model. On the one hand the 
official exchange rate might Granger-cause the parallel exchange rate. This can happen for 
example when, observing key macroeconomic variables (especially in short-run), private 
agents have imperfect information compared with the central authority. But it is also possible 
for the parallel rate to Granger-cause the official rate. Indeed this situation may be more 
common. When exchange rate policy is endogenous the official exchange rate is set to react 
to any inflationary trend. In this situation, the black market exchange rate can help to forecast 
the official exchange rate. The causality test used in this paper will follow the Agénor and 
Taylor approach. In our bivariate model, the variables analysed are the Chinese official 
exchange rate and the underground black market rate. Using the Granger causality model 
incorporating an ECM term we will identify any causal relationship and its direction. 
3.2 ARIMA models and interventional analysis 
The black market premium is defined as the amount by which the parallel rate exceeds the 
official rate (Figure 2). It is one of the most important measures that been discussed in the 
previous research. Agénor (1992) compares the parallel market premium of some typical 
developing countries in 1980s and indicates that a negative black market premium was rarely 
found. Examining the data from these developing countries, a negative premium appears only 
when there is a revaluation of the official rate, or it is the result of “laundering charging” 
(Dornbusch et al., 1983) by commercial banks which had been paid from selling foreign 
currency to parties with no right to buy. Other than for these exceptions the black market 
premium was always positive. The reason is, as Boulding (1947) pointed out, that the black 
market yield can only exist when the official rate is below the theoretical free market price. 
Actually, in China, a negative premium has never happened in the history of foreign 
exchange.  
If the black market premium varied too much, the government would adjust the official rate 
to fit the market. A high black market level would to some extend weaken the balance of 
payments and also limit the effectiveness of capital controls (Agénor, 1992). Generally, the 
authorities use a one shot devaluation of the official rate to unify the official and black market 
rates. The black rate establishing balance of payments equilibrium in the long-run should be 
equal to the rate under a floating regime. In the short-run, the rate is largely associated with 
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the expectations of private agents. For most developing countries research suggests that the 
unification between the parallel markets (e.g. official and black market, or official and swap 
market) is achieved by the authorities, where the analysis interestingly shows that the post 
unification exchange rate is close to the pre-reform black rate. This is what happened in 
China in 1985, when the authorities used the real time black market rate to unify the official 
market, replacing the coexistence of a swap and official market. 
Yin and Stoever (1994) conducted empirical research on the black market premium in China. 
They use monthly data on the black market premium from January 1975 to June 1991 in an 
ARIMA model, adding two independent variables (the real exchange rate, adjusted interest 
rate differential) based on the approach of Dornbusch et al. (1983), thus combining 
interventional analysis with three impulse dummy variables. This model tests five hypotheses 
using an ARIMA(1,1,1) model: the linear relationships of black market premium and the real 
exchange rate (negative), the interest rate differential (positive), the issuance of Foreign 
Exchange Certificates(FEC) (negative), the large-scale importation of consumer goods 
(negative), and the large-scale operation of the Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centres 
(FEACs) (negative). The results confirm the significant relationships with the real exchange 
rate, and the three dummies: the issuance of FEC, the large-scale importation, and the large-
scale FEACs. 
In this paper, a similar model will be applied for a longer range of data. After selecting a 
suitable ARIMA model we add the real exchange rate and an intervention dummy relating to 
the unification policy of the authorities. The aim is to establish the nature of the relationship 
between the black market and the official market, to see whether the official price can be 
replaced by the black market price or not.  
 
4 Methodology and the test results 
4.1 Granger Causality tests with an ECM 
Data 
The data on the RMB/USD official exchange rate is taken from the International Financial 
Statistics, various volumes. The Black market rate data is from the China section in the World 
Currency Yearbook which referenced the investigations of Shanghai peddlers and vendors1. 
Both the official rate data and the black market rate data are monthly as reported at the end 
day of each period. The data range is from January 1971 to December 2002. 
Unit root test (Stationarity test) 
For testing a bivariate relationship using the Granger causality test (Granger, 1969), a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for this test is that the series involved should be 
                                                 
1
 Most of the empirical research on the Chinese underground market uses the same source, e.g. Ding (1998); Phylaktis & 
Girardin (2001);Yin and Stoever (1994), etc. Given the reputation of this organization, the data is considered reliable to use. 
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stationary. Here the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is used to examine both series: the 
official market exchange rate and the black market exchange rate. The ADF is a primary 
stationarity test for time series data through the hypothesis test for the parameter  in 
equation 1: 
        (1) 
We wish to test the null hypothesis H0: -1=0, that is whether the assumption that the data 
series is not stationary can be rejected or not. Compared with the Dickey Fuller (DF) test, the 
ADF test adds lagged differences  to ensure serial independence in the 
disturbances. 
 I(0) I(1) 
Official Market Exchange Rate 0.055355 (0.9619) -19.51638 (0.0000) 
Black Market Exchange Rate -1.671168 (0.4452) -4.357058 (0.0004) 
Table 1 ADF test for the official exchange rate and the black exchange rate1 
In Table 1 results are shown for tests conducted on both the original series and their first 
differences.  For the official exchange rate we can see that the null hypothesis - the series is 
not stationary- cannot be rejected; we find the same for the black market exchange rate (with 
probability values of 0.9619 and 0.4452 respectively). The results for the first differenced 
official exchange rate and the first differenced black rate show that they are both stationary 
(rejecting the null with p-values of 0.0000 and 0.0004). Therefore, through the test, both 
series are non-stationary and have one unit root; they are I(1). This means the first 
differenced series are stationary and can be used in the Granger causality test. 
 
A Granger causality test for the official rate and the black rate (short-run) 
The Granger causality test is based on a vector autoregressive system – see equations 2a and 
2b.  denote the transformed (first differenced) values of the official and parallel exchange 
rates,  and  respectively.  
        (2a) 
       (2b) 
When all the coefficients  and at least one coefficient  are significantly different from 
zero, the lagged values of can help to forecast the values of; this is what it called 
Granger causing. The test results are shown in Table 2 for a maximum lag of 1, 2, and 3 
                                                 
1
 In this paper, the econometric approach software is EViews6. 
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months. It can be seen that the differenced black exchange rate can help to predict the value 
of the differenced official exchange rate exchange, but not vice versa.    
  Null Hypothesis:   e does not Granger cause b b does not Granger cause e 
Lag1 1.47643 (0.2251) 9.4402 (0.0023) 
Lag2 1.07552 (0.3422) 6.21651 (0.0022) 
Lag3 1.14230 (0.3318) 5.68145 (0.0008) 
Table 2 Granger causality test results 
However, as Agénor and Taylor (1993) noted, quoting Geweke (1984), any transformation of 
the original series, such as taking the logarithm or differencing, may affect the causality 
structure, and so the test result cannot be guaranteed for the long run. Agénor and Taylor 
(1993) introduced an error correction term in each equation of the vector autoregressive when 
testing Granger causality. This error correction term helps us to distinguish long-run from 
short-run Granger causality and plays a speed adjustment role. By including these terms the 
model has been transformed to a cointegration VAR test function. 
The Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model with an Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) 
Engle and Granger first suggested the concept of cointegration in 1987. Cointegration can be 
defined as follows: if two series are I(1), integrated of order 1, but a linear combination of the 
series is I(0), stationary, then the series can be said to be cointegrated. Engle and Granger 
also established a link between cointegration and error correction models (the so-called 
Representation Theorem). If two series are cointegrated then there exists an error correction 
representation connecting the series.  
Johansen (1988) established a more satisfactory approach to the testing of cointegration, 
based on maximum likelihood estimation in the context of vector autoregressive (VAR) 
models with error correction terms. In this section the Johansen cointegration Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) framework will be used to estimate the cointegration rank between the 
black market rate and the official market rate. In such a model, a matrix  can be interpreted 
as the long run coefficient matrix. A VAR with k lags can be written as shown in equation (3). 
Where, Et is an N×1 vector variable process at time t. k is an N×N parameters matrix.  is an 
N×1 vector of constants and t is an N×1 vector of  white noise terms. In our case N equals 
to 2 as we are just considering the two series e (the official exchange rate) and b (the black 
market rate). 
       (3) 
The Johansen cointegration test examines the eigenvalues of the  matrix to confirm the 
cointegration relationships. The cointegration rank number in the system is equal to the 
number of eigenvalues that matrix  has. A significant eigenvalue indicates a significant 
cointegrating vector, i.e. cointegrating relationship. The matrix  can be zero rank which 
would mean that there is no cointegrating relationship in the system. Alternatively,  can be 
 14 
of full rank, which means the original series are stationary. (Johansen, 1988; Johansen and 
Juselius, 1990). 
There are two test statistics for cointegration under the Johansen approach, which consider 
the trace and max statistics. With trace we have a joint test for which the null hypothesis is that 
the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to the rank of the matrix . The 
alternative hypothesis is that there are more than r cointegrating vectors. The other test is 
based on max, the maximum eigenvalue statistic. It starts from testing the null hypothesis that 
at most r (r begins at 0) cointegration rank exist, and is conducted according to the sequence 
of a previous test until the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The hypotheses for max are: 
H0: r = 0 versus H1: 0 < r g 
H0: r = 1 versus H1: 1 < r g 
H0: r = 2 versus H1: 2 < r g 
…  …    … 
H0: r = g – 1 versus H1: r = g 
If the first test for the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors (corresponding to  having 
zero rank) cannot be rejected, it would be concluded that there are no cointegrating vectors 
and the testing would be completed. Otherwise, if the H0: r = 0 has been rejected, the second 
null of there being at most one cointegrating vector would be tested and so on. The number of 
the cointegration rank r is continuously increased until the null is no longer rejected.  
    Maximum Eigenvalue Trace 
None * 13.60283(0.0188) 13.78531(0.0282) 
At most 1 0.182473(0.7233) 0.182473(0.7233) 
Table 3 Cointegration VAR test for the black market rate and the official market rate 
As the results show in Table 3, the long-run cointegration between the official exchange rate 
and the black exchange rate can be confirmed. Both Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace 
statistics reject the null of zero cointegrating vectors. There is one cointegration rank existing 
in this bivariate system. 
Granger-causality Test with Error correction mechanism (ECM) for the Long-run 
Once the cointegration vector has been confirmed, the error correction mechanism (ECM) is 
used to model the long-run equilibrium relationship between the two cointegrating variables. 
The ECM is necessary to ensure a long-run equilibrium solution linking the variables. The 
official exchange rate used in this paper has been controlled to take the same value for a 
number of years. So when this data series is differenced, there is a long sequence of zero 
values. The ECM, on the other hand, incorporates not only these first difference terms, but 
also an error correction term which is made up of lagged levels of the cointegrated variables. 
Thus, it is able to capture both short-run movements and the long-run relationship. The ECM 
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for the official exchange rate e and the black exchange rate b can be written as shown in 
equation (4).  
          (4)  
1 describes the short-run relationship between e and b. 2 describes the speed of adjustment 
back to equilibrium, or to be more precise, it measures the proportion of last period’s 
equilibrium error that is corrected for. This term, et-1-	bt-1, is the error correction term. 	 is the 
cointegrating coefficient, which describes the long run relationship between e and b. The next 
step is to construct the ECM as a normalized equation which, in our case, produces the 
following estimates: ECM=1*Official rate –0.939647*Black rate 
We then use single equation least squares to test for long-run Granger-causality.  
          (5a)  
        (5b)  
We then test separately to see if the coefficients of the ECM terms in these equations are 
significantly different from zero, as well as checking whether the lagged values of the first-
differences of each variable contributes in any way to improving predictions of the other first-
differenced variable.  We can see from Table 4 that the black rate Granger-causes the official 
exchange rate in the long-run, while there is no statistical evidence of Granger causality in the 
other direction. The official rate and black rate in China are cointegrated and so the black rate 
Granger-causes the official rate in both the long-run and short run. 
Short-run Granger causality from the black 
to the official rate 
Wald test for linear restrictions 
F-statistic (P-probability) 
	1=0 7.9644 (0.0050) 
11=12=13=14=15=16=17=0 9.7537 (0.0000) 
	1= 11=12=13=14=15=16=17=0 10.3851 (0.0000) 
Short-run Granger causality from the official to the black rate 
	2=0 1.3655 (0.2434) 

21=
22=
23=
24=
25=
26=
27=0 1.3862 (0.2098) 
	2= 
21=
22=
23=
24=
25=
26=
27=0 1.5640 (0.1341) 
Table 4 Granger causality model with ECM test results 
 
4.2 ARIMA model and Intervention Analysis for the black rate 
In this section of the paper we employ an Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average 
(ARIMA) model, based on the work of Yin and Stoever (1994) incorporating the 
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interventional analysis by Box and Tiao (1975), to model the Chinese black market premium. 
In an ARIMA(p, d, q) model, p indicates the autoregressive (AR) order, d is the differencing 
order, and q is the order of moving average disturbances (MA). The order of differencing d is 
established by the number of times the series must be differenced to obtain a stationary series. 
The data used in this part is the same as 4.1. The data range is the same from January 1971 to 
December 2002 and the frequency is monthly. The USD/RMB black market premium data, 
as explained before, is the difference between the black market rate and the official market 
rate.  
The ADF test results for stationarity of the black market premium shown in Table 5 indicate 
that the series has to be differenced once to become stationary. Thus the order number d takes 
the value of 1. 
 p(0) p(1) 
Black market premium -1.317164 (0.6227) -17.90938 (0.0000) ** 
Table 5 ADF test for the official exchange rate and the black market premium 
 
Then, for deciding the AR order p and MA order q, the Akaike Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz 
Criteria (SC) will be compared between each ARMA model. Comparing the results in Table 
6 it can be seen that the lowest values for both AIC and SC occurs for the ARMA(1,1) model. 
Based on the principle of parsimony, the ARIMA(1,1,1) model is adopted. 
 Akaike info 
criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
ARMA(1,1) 0.481330* 0.501946* 
ARMA(1,2) 0.484785 0.515710 
ARMA(1,3) 0.487966 0.529198 
ARMA(2,1) 0.487367 0.518352 
ARMA(2,2) 0.487367 0.518352 
ARMA(2,3) 0.495454 0.547095 
ARMA(3,1) 0.492407 0.533801 
ARMA(3,2) 0.497506 0.549248 
Table 6 AIC & SBC comparison for ARMA model 
 
Following the approach of Dornbush, et al. (1983), the real exchange rate will be added into 
the ARIMA model to assess its effect on the black market premium. The justification for the 
inclusion of this variable comes from the theory of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which is 
related to the law of one price (LOOP) for a standard basket of goods. Through the PPP 
theory, the exchange rate between two currencies should be equal to the ratio of the two 
relevant national price levels.  
 17 
The exchange rate between two currencies and their prices level can be written as equation 
(6). There, pt is the domestic price level at time t, p*t denotes the price level of some foreign 
countries at time t. st is the nominal exchange rate of these two countries’ currencies at the 
same time. 
             (6) 
The real exchange rate is the ratio of the real purchasing power between these two countries 
through the official exchange rate. The real exchange rate qt function is shown in equation (7).  
            (7) 
We can measure the price levels in the two countries by their respective national consumer 
price index (CPI) series. Hence, the real exchange rate between China and United States is 
identically equal to the official exchange rate of RMB/USD st (counted by the amount of 
RMB required to buy one unit of USD) multiplied by the ratio of the Chinese CPI1 pt to the 
U.S. CPI2 p*t. The real exchange rate series is also monthly, running from January 1971 to 
December 2002. 
This model also includes two intervention dummies to represent policy differences over the 
period. This relates to phases where the authorities effectively unified the official market and 
black market rates3. This occurred twice, phase one running from 1970:1 to 1985:8, and 
phase two from 1985:9 to 2002:12. Therefore, the dummy variable D1 is set equal to one 
from January 1970 to August 1985, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable D2 is zero from 
1970:1 to 1985:8 and one in the second phase. 
Incorporating these dummies and the real exchange rate into the ARIMA(1,1,1) model for the 
black market premium yields the following estimated equation: 
 
The figures in brackets show the probability value of the t-test. The result confirms our a 
priori assumptions about the affects of changes in the real exchange rate. When the RMB 
nominal price increases, the black market premium will scale down. We see that government 
action, as represented by the dummy variables, can also influence the black market premium 
significantly. 
5 Conclusion and discussion  
The main aim of this paper has been to test whether or not the black market exchange rate can 
replace the official market rate in a particular period when the official rate was fixed by the 
                                                 
1Chinese CPI source: National Bureau of Statistics, China. Price index set 2000=100. 
2
 US CPI source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Price index set 2000=100. 
3
 See before the timeline D in 2 the review of the Chinese parallel market. 
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authorities. Analysing the data we see that these two market rates show similar trends. 
However the black market rate showed itself to be more sensitive than the official rate in 
responding to changes in market conditions. In confirming the requirements of this 
hypothesis, two different methodological approaches have been used; (i) to examine the 
relationship of the official rate and the black rate, and (ii) to examine movements in the black 
market premium. The data used in this paper cover 32 years of monthly values of the 
USD/RMB rate from 1971M1 to 2002M12.  
First, the Granger causality test confirmed the short-run causal relationship between these 
two variables, and the Johansen test showed that the official exchange rate and the black 
market rate are cointegrated. As Agéno and Taylor (1993) found when cointegration exists in 
the official-parallel market bivariate model, at least one market rate can help to forecast the 
other. However, there are two limitations to the standard Granger causality test: the data 
structure problem and the absence of a test for a long-run relationship. An ECM from the 
cointegration equation is used to patch into the original Granger model. The evidence for the 
Chinese market showed that the black market rate is able to be used for forecasting the 
official rate but not vice versa. 
Second, the reaction of the black market rate to major events in China confirmed its free 
market credentials. An ARIMA model that also included a real exchange rate term and 
intervention dummies indicated a significant linear relationship between the black market 
premium and the real exchange rate and the authorities’ unification policy. The negative 
relationship with the real exchange rate confirms the view that a tight economic policy or a 
higher inflation rate will stimulate the development of the black market and increase the 
black market premium. The significant positive reaction to the government unification  policy 
supports enables us to acceptation the view that the black market was sensitive to market 
information and policies. 
Application of these two approaches to the black market rate confirmed the linkage between 
the controlled official market and the free market rate. We are able to conclude that, in the 
historic period when the official exchange market in China was under tight control, the black 
market had the essential free-market characteristics and also was causally connected with the 
official rate. Therefore it can be used in any analysis which requires free market data. 
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